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Japan’s Military Modernisation:  
A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power 
Projection 
 
CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES 
 
 
Japan backtracking or inching forward in security? 
Japan’s security trajectory, in the period following the administration of Prime 
Minister Koizumi Junichirō, has once again come into question. Japan under 
Koizumi’s administration demonstrated startling new proactivism in responding to the 
events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terrorism’. Japan despatched 
the despatch Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) from November 2001 onwards to 
provide logistical support in the Indian Ocean for US and international coalition 
forces engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom. Japan further demonstrated its new 
pro-activity through the despatch of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) and Air 
Self Defence Force (ASDF) on non-combat reconstruction missions as part of the US-
led ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq and Kuwait from 2004 onwards. Japan and the US 
then concluded the 2006 Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) which facilitated 
the realignment of US bases in Japan, promoted the greater integration of US forces 
and the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF), and now opened the way for the US to 
utilise its bases in Japan for projecting power globally. Japan was seen to be moving 
towards the increased militarisation of its security stance, and to be emerging as a 
more assertive or ‘normal’ military power and reliable US ally.1
 
However, following Koizumi’s stepping down from power in September 2006, his 
successors have found it seemingly difficult to maintain a similar level of momentum 
in Japan’s security policy. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō looked to take Japan in yet 
more radical directions with plans for plans for a US-style Japan National Security 
Council (JNSC); to investigate means to breach Japan’s self-imposed ban on the 
exercise of the right of collective self-defence and to revise Article 9 of the 
Constitution; and to forge closer military links with the US, Australia, India, and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with an implicit intention of countering 
China’s rise. Abe found his plans frustrated, though, by his governing Liberal 
Democratic Party’s (LDP) defeat in the House of Councillors elections of July 2007, 
which turned over control of the upper chamber in the National Diet to the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ proceeded to block renewal of the MSDF 
mission in the Indian Ocean, forcing Abe’s eventual resignation over his failure to 
fulfil his pledge to the US to maintain Japan’s commitment to the ‘war on terrorism’. 
Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, Abe’s immediate successor, then showed greater 
caution on security. Fukuda did manage to force the renewal of the MSDF mission 
through the National Diet in January 2008; and demonstrated some interest in mid-
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2008 in formulating a permanent despatch law (kōkyū hōan) to obviate the need for 
struggles in the National Diet over JSDF overseas despatch. Fukuda, though, later 
dropped plans for the permanent despatch law, shelved Abe’s plans regarding the 
JNSC and constitutional reinterpretation, and became preoccupied with fire-fighting 
Japan Ministry of Defence (JMOD) and JSDF scandals concerning procurement and 
civilian control. In turn, Fukuda was in part forced, like Abe, to resign in September 
2008 due to his continuing problems in the National Diet in securing a further renewal 
of the MSDF Indian Ocean mission. Japanese security policy momentum only seems 
to have again been picked up under the current administration of Prime Minister Asō 
Tarō. Asō again forced the renewal of the Indian Ocean mission through the National 
Diet in December 2008, and then in March 2009 ordered the despatch of the MSDF 
on a separate mission to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy missions. Japan’s concern 
over North Korea’s planned launch of a long-range missile in April 2009 may also 
add new urgency to Japan’s security policy planning.  
 
Nevertheless, the impression for many observers since 2006 has been of relative stasis 
and even retrenchment in Japanese security, with Japan retreating back into its 
reactive security shell post-Koizumi, and with domestic anti-militaristic norms once 
again overriding international security pressure and ambitions.2 The argument of this 
article is that these observers are indeed correct to see strong residual anti-militaristic 
principles in Japan, and thus Japan’s security policy is still subject to cautious 
incrementalism. However, this article argues more importantly that Japan is still 
continuing along its long-term trajectory of becoming a ‘normal’ power relatively 
unaffected by recent political machinations. Most of the deep structural changes put in 
train during, and indeed before, the Koizumi administration, in areas such as defence 
production, the transformation of civilian control, and most especially US-Japan 
realignments, have continued under Abe, Fukuda and Asō.3 This article cannot cover 
all of these, but instead chooses to focus on the issue of the modernisation of JSDF 
capabilities as a key illustration of this process of ongoing proactivity in Japanese 
security policy.  
 
The article starts by briefly examining the international security pressures placed upon 
Japan by its regional and global security environment that therefore feed through into 
the need to modernise its military forces. It then considers trends in Japan’s defence 
spending and how far these constrain JSDF procurement ambitions, and moves on to 
consider the evolving capabilities of the JSDF. It analyses Japan’s current and future 
military procurement plans, as seen in the 2004 National Defence Guidelines (NDPG) 
and Mid-Term Defence Programme (MTDP), and looks forward to the scheduled 
revision NDPG and MTDP for 2009 onwards, in order to gauge its long-term strategic 
ambitions. The article considers the on-going and requested procurement programmes 
for the three services of the JSDF, as well as for the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), a 
paramilitary extension of Japan’s armed forces. The article analyses Japan’s plans for 
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the acquisition of a next generation F-X fighter; new transport and maritime patrol 
aircraft; Destroyer-Helicopter (DDH) light helicopter carriers; and Ballistic Missile 
Defence (BMD) programmes. The article considers also Japan’s increasing 
militarisation of its space activities, through the launching of intelligence satellites 
and a new Basic Space Law in 2008. Finally, the article considers the upgrading of 
the JCG’s capabilities and role as a so-called ‘second Japanese navy’. Hence, in 
contrast to analyses that have only concentrated on recent political events post-
Koizumi, and thus portray a picture of stagnation in Japanese security policy, this 
article presents long-term evidence of proactive trends in JSDF procurement, for five 
or ten years hence, and which indicate growing power projection ambitions and 
capabilities. Indeed, the article argues that much of Japan’s plans to modernise its 
military capabilities is driven by and reinforcing a quiet Japan-China arms race in 
East Asia. The consequent conclusion of this article is that Japan, rather than its 
options shrinking post-Koizumi for international security activities, is actually, in 
terms of capabilities, widening its choices to respond to potential regional adversaries 
such as North Korea and China, and to participate in US-led multinational and UN 
operations in East Asia and on a global scale.  
 
Japan’s international security environment and military modernisation 
Japan is afforded minimal room for retrenchment in security post-Koizumi, despite 
continuing anti-militaristic norms, because of continuing pressures from the 
international system in terms of rising regional and global military challenges, and 
rising expectations of a Japanese contribution to countering these from the US and 
other international partners. Japan’s immediate anxieties are clearly focussed on 
North Korea’s development of ballistic missiles and its nuclear programme. 
Additionally, Japan has been concerned about the incursion of North Korean ‘spy 
ships’ (fushinsen) on espionage missions into Japanese maritime and land territory.  
However, it is China which poses the greatest challenge for Japanese security over the 
longer term. Japan has been concerned at China’s modernisation of its conventional 
and nuclear forces since the early 1990s, and in particular the lack of transparency in 
its double digit increases in defence expenditure. Japan has watched the augmentation 
of China’s ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, including: new submarine launched 
cruise missiles with a range of around 2,000 kilometres and with capabilities similar 
to US Tomahawks; and the general upgrading of its air defence and offence 
capabilities through the deployment of Su-27 and Su-30MK strike aircraft, 
indigenously developed J-10 and FB-7A combat aircraft, a new J-X stealth fighter, 
and the airborne and early warning and control KJ-200 and Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) KJ-2000 programmes. Japan was alarmed at China’s test 
of an anti-satellite system in January 2007, probably capable of disrupting US satellite 
capabilities and also Japan’s burgeoning military satellite programme.4
Japan has viewed with apprehension China’s introduction of Type 052C Luyang II 
DDGs destroyers, Type 051C Luzhou DDGs destroyers, and Type 054A Jiangkai 
frigates, which seemed designed to provide capabilities somewhat equivalent to Aegis 
air defence system of the US and Japan, and to be experimenting with stealth 
technologies; as well as China’s apparent continuing interest in aircraft carrier 
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technologies, demonstrated by its refurbishment of the former 65,000 tonne Ukrainian 
aircraft carrier Varyag in Dalian since 2002 and speculation that China might 
purchase fourteen Su-33 fighters from Russia modified for carrier use. Japan has also 
taken note of Chinese submarine incursions into its territorial waters: detecting the 
passage of a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine in its territorial waters on 10 
November 2004 (Japan later securing an apology from China which claimed the 
submarine had unintentionally veered off course), and claiming that a Chinese 
submarine entered its territorial waters in September 2008 (although any involvement 
in this incident was denied by China). Most recently, Japan has taken special note of 
China’s decision in December 2009 to despatch two destroyers to the Gulf of Somalia 
for anti-piracy missions as a sign of China’s global naval power projection ambitions. 
All of these capabilities suggest that China is not just modernising its military 
capabilities per se, but that it has a new appetite to project military power outside its 
own territory to secure its national interests, and thus it may be able to threaten 
Japan’s interests in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islets, interrupt Japan’s vital sea 
lines of communication (SLOC), and even to attack Japan’s southern island and 
Okinawa in an attempt to stop the US deploying from its bases in Japan in the event 
of a Taiwan Straits contingency.  
 
Japan, in addition to North Korea and China, also contains additional concerns over 
the resurgence of Russian power. Japan in February 2008 scrambled two F-15s to 
intercept a Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber which had violated its airspace at the end 
of the Izu island chain, some 650 kilometres south of Tokyo.5  Russia’s constant 
railing against US Missile Defence (MD) plans, and by implication Japan’s 
cooperation with the US on BMD, has also been discomforting; as has Russia’s resort 
to force in Georgia in August 2008, with Japan mindful of its own ongoing territorial 
dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories. 
 
Japan’s security agenda has been complicated by the rise of concerns in East Asia and 
beyond about transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and by increasing pressure from the US to provide support for 
international efforts to counter these threats. Japan has faced continued demands from 
the US to recognise the need to upgrade its military capabilities and the US-Japan 
alliance to respond to global contingencies. The US has stressed a move from ‘threat-
based’ regional alliances to ‘capabilities-based’ global alliances, that are capable of 
constructing flexible coalitions with inter-operable military assets for operating in the 
‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. In addition, the 
Global Posture Review (GPR) of 2004 made clear the US’s intention that bases 
provided by regional alliances should be integrated into its strategy for the ‘surging’ 
and global deployment of its forward deployed forces. Japan thus is increasingly 
obligated to develop the necessary inventory of capabilities that can slot in alongside 
US-led multinational coalitions.  
 
Japan’s evolving defence doctrines 
Japan, in order to respond to multifarious security challenges, has found it necessary 
to embark on successive revisions of its national defence doctrines and capabilities, a 
process initiated towards the end of the Koizumi administration, but still rolling 
forward under his successors, and indeed to be reinitiated from 2009 onwards. Japan 
released a revised NDPG in December 2004, together with the release of a new 
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MTDP for 2005-2009 setting out Japan’s long-term military procurement plans. The 
NDPG stressed Japan’s regional security concerns and the importance of the US-
Japan alliance in responding to these, and outlined a range of new threats to Japan, 
including responses to ballistic missile attacks, guerrilla and special operations attacks, 
incursions into its territorial waters, and chemical and biological warfare. These 
concerns are a clear reflection of recent perceived regional threats from North Korean 
and Chinese activities; and the NDPG went further in identifying North Korea 
specifically as a destabilising factor in East Asia, but also for the first time in 
identifying concerns about China’s impact on regional security, although this was 
couched in the oblique language of needing to ‘remain attentive’ to China’s future 
military modernisation. The NDPG also demonstrated a new emphasis upon global 
security interests outside East Asia. The NDPG stated that the ‘the region spreading 
from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan’, thereby mapping Japan’s own 
security interests onto those of the US in the ‘arc of instability’, and focussed on the 
need for Japan to engage actively in ‘international peace cooperation’ activities 
through the despatch of the JSDF to support US-led and UN multinational 
operations.6
 
In turn, for Japan to fulfil these regional and global responsibilities, the NDPG and 
MTDP advocated that the JSDF should seek to establish ‘multi-functional, flexible 
and effective’ forces. These forces are to be characterised by mobility and rapid-
reaction; enhanced joint command and control, and the capability to undertake joint 
tri-service operations; increased inter-operability with UN and US forces; and the 
utilisation of state-of-the art intelligence and military technologies. In terms of 
specific JSDF organisation and hardware, the MTDP stresses a quantitative build-
down from Japan’s Cold War-style forces, and a switch instead to a lighter and 
qualitatively strengthened JSDF, now disposing of greater power projection 
capabilities.  
 
The 2004 NDPG set the agenda for the augmentation of Japanese military power and 
capabilities for a five year period stretching beyond the end of Koizumi’s premiership, 
and as of 2009 Japanese security planners are engaged in the process of devising 
another revised NDPG for release at the end of the year. The JMOD started internal 
discussions on the revised NDPG in 2008; and, in the tradition of the revisions of the 
1995 NDPO and 2004 NDPG, Prime Minister Asō established within his own office 
in January 2009 a new Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Defence. Hence, Japan is 
engaged in long-term planning for its security policy, and it is within this context that 
the extent of dynamism in its security policy is best able to be judged.   
 
Japan’s defence budget  
 
Japan’s defence budget since the late currency terms has not experienced the large 
scale growth of the US, major NATO states, Russia, and even China, in the post-11 
September period, staying rooted at a less than one per cent annual growth rate until 
2002, and then actually contracting to rates of growth between 0.1 and 1.0 per cent up 
until 2008.7 Defence expenditure can be seen to be declining in relative importance as 
a government priority in comparison to the increasing proportion of expenditure 
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devoted to social security and public works in the last decade. The amounts available 
within this tightening defence budget for the procurement of new weapon systems are 
also under apparent pressure. The breakdown of the defence budget demonstrates the 
long term trend of an increasing proportion of funds, up to 44 per cent by 2008, 
directed towards personnel and provisions, whereas the proportion directed to 
equipment acquisition has declined from around 23 per cent of the budget in 1988 to 
around 17 per cent in 2008. 8  Japan’s defence allocations remain under constant 
budgetary attack from other sectors, with JMOD requests for 1.2-1.5 per cent 
increases in its budget cut down to below one per cent. Japan has thus been able to 
keep its defence budget well below the one per cent of GNP ceiling first established in 
1976.  
 
However, whilst it is indisputable that the size of the defence budget is an important 
constraint on Japan’s procurement plans, it has to be noted that Japan has been able in 
other ways to maintain or actually increase defence expenditure, and that as a 
consequence the apparent quantitative budgetary restrictions have not been an 
absolute bar on the qualitative expansion of military power. Japan, first off, has 
actually increased the budget for its paramilitary JCG.9 Secondly, Japan has found 
budgetary flexibility through the practice of deferred payments (saimu futan koi).10 
This has been used since the 1970s to spread the costs of weapon systems over a 
number of years, building up large-scale future payments equivalent to 60%-plus of 
defence expenditure These payments have to be serviced at some point from the 
current defence budget, and thus may limit future budgetary growth, but the practice 
has allowed for considerable flexibility with regard to surpassing the formal one per 
cent GNP limit, and has enabled Japan to continue the procurement of qualitatively 
upgraded capabilities.  
 
 
JSDF capabilities: a shift to power projection 
The GSDF, in line with Japan’s intent to build up qualitative capabilities, is seeking to 
convert itself into a mobile force for overseas operations. The GSDF has continued to 
introduce the 50-tonne M-90 main battle tank (MBT), and is developing a lighter 
weight 44-tonne TK-X MBT, more easily transportable within and outside Japan, and 
designed for anti-guerrilla operations and with armour particularly effective against 
rocket propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices (IED). The GSDF 
maintains an interest in acquiring 300-kilometre range shore-to-shore missiles for the 
defence of off-shore islands, having originally been denied these in the 2004 NDPG.  
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The GSDF was dealt a setback in 2009 with the decision to halt procurement of the 
AH64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter at just ten units, having originally planned 
to acquire fifty two of aircraft through licensed production. However, the JMOD was 
forced to curtail orders due to the rising unit costs associated with licensed production, 
and instead may opt for upgrading its existing AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters or to 
develop an attack version of its OH-1. However, the GSDF’s power projection 
ambitions continue to be demonstrated by its procurement of CH-47JA transport 
helicopters, and the provision within the 2009 defence budget of additional ballistic 
protection for these helicopters. Japan appears to be following the example of states 
such as the UK which have added armour to their Chinook helicopters to cope with 
conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus is preparing the option of despatch to 
such theatres if necessary.  
 
The GSDF established a Central Readiness Group (CRG) in 2007, combining the elite 
1st Airborne Brigade; 1st Helicopter Brigade; 101st NBC Unit; and Special Operations 
Group (SOG). The CRG represents a new innovation for Japan, aiming to function as 
a rapid reaction force for coordinating nationwide mobile operations, responding to 
domestic terrorism, guerrilla incursions, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, and 
for training personnel for overseas despatch. Japan’s establishment of SOG in 2004 
also represents a new interest in special forces with the SOG’s balaclava-clad 
personnel parading publicly during the ceremony for the establishment of the CRG in 
2007.  
 
ASDF power projection capabilities have been strengthened in recent years through 
the procurement of the F-2 fighter-bomber (although in smaller numbers than 
originally hoped for), and through gaining for the first time an in-flight refuelling 
capability with the procurement of four KC767 tanker aircraft (the first delivered in 
February 2008). The ASDF is also upgrading its E-767 AWACS radar to improve 
capabilities to counter cruise missiles. 
 
The ASDF has been forced to curtail some of its defensive capabilities due to Japan’s 
eventual agreement to sign the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 
2008. Japan maintains considerable stocks of cluster bombs deemed useful for the 
defence of its long coastline against invasion. Japan originally proposed a partial ban 
on cluster bombs, prohibiting their use in urban areas, and the adoption instead of 
‘smart’ versions with a smaller number of bomblets and with self-destruction 
mechanisms to prevent injury to non-combatants. Japan’s government decided in the 
end to fully commit to the Oslo Convention and to dismantle its stocks of cluster 
bombs at considerable cost (reportedly ¥20billion), not to introduce new cluster 
bombs, and to provide ¥600 million for assisting the victims of these weapons.11 
Japan’s stance was in many ways a demonstration of the continuing strength of its 
anti-militaristic principles, confirmed by its securing cross-party agreement in the 
National Diet. 
 
At the same time, though, Japan used the abandonment of its cluster bomb capabilities 
as an opportunity to strengthen the ASDF’s capabilities in other ways. The ASDF has 
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compensated for the loss of this more crude defensive capability by including for the 
first time in its budget allocation the fitting of its F-2s with Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions (JDAM), providing an arguably more sophisticated defence, and even 
offensive, capability.12 The ASDF procurement of JDAMs, its continuing interest in 
airborne electronic jamming equipment, and its in-flight refuelling assets should now 
provide it with the potential to strike against enemy missile bases. 
 
In addition, the ASDF is looking to replace its ageing F-4J fighter-bomber with a new 
F-X air-superiority interceptor that is capable of besting China’s Su-27, J-10 and JF-
17. Japan has shown prime interest in the US’s FA-22A Raptor, and a secondary 
interest in BAE System’s Eurofighter Typhoon. The F-22 thus far, though, has been 
denied to Japan due to the US Congress’s Obey Amendment and consequent embargo 
on the overseas sale of the aircraft. Prime Minister Abe during his visit to Washington 
DC in April 2007 requested that the US release data on the F-22, and Minister of 
Defence Kyūma Fumio again raised the issue with Defence Secretary Robert Gates in 
a meeting in Washington on 31 April. The US Congress, however, maintained the ban 
on exports in July 2008; a move compounded by US fears that Japan might leak 
sensitive technical information given an ongoing scandal over failures to maintain 
safeguards on the protection of Aegis system specifications, and possibly also by 
concerns about the impact on the regional balance of power of providing the F-22 to 
Japan. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney in an 
interview of 13 May 2008 advised that the US was highly unlikely to transfer 
information on the F-22 to Japan, and that it should look instead to the F-35 as a new 
fighter acquisition. US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer repeated this stance in Tokyo 
the same month.13
 
Japan, in the absence of any immediate opportunity to acquire the F-22, and because 
of the related need to assess other possible candidates for its new fighter, has decided 
to defer a decision on procurement of the F-X until the new MTDP for 2010-2014. In 
the meantime, the ASDF as a stopgap measure is investing in upgrades to the radar 
and AAM-5 air-to-air missiles of its F-15s, especially to improve dog-fighting 
capabilities and to counter cruise missiles. The JMOD has apportioned ¥8.5 billion for 
the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) and Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries to conduct research into an Advanced Technology Demonstration-X (ATD-
X) stealth fighter prototype, and with a profile strikingly similar to the F-22.  
 
Japan, in deferring the decision on the F-X may try to hold out for the F-22 under the 
new Barak Obama administration. Japan’s possible future success in procuring the F-
22—and the very fact that it seeks such a capable fighter and similar stealth 
technologies—are important indications of its expanding military ambitions. The F-22 
would provide Japan with important air defence capabilities for its own territory. At 
the same time, though, the ASDF’s deployment of the F-22, combined with new in-
flight refuelling capabilities (and consistent with the aircraft’s role for the USAF), 
would provide Japan with a potential new capability to penetrate and destroy the air 
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defences of any regional adversary—indicating again new power projection 
capabilities.  
 
The ASDF is further seeking to augment its power projection capabilities with an 
indigenously produced C-X replacement for its C-1 transports, providing an increased 
6,000 kilometre range and broadened fuselage for a twenty-six ton payload which will 
serve as the principal means of air transport for a GSDF rapid reaction force to 
regional contingencies and beyond. However, the JMOD chose not to request the 
immediate procurement of the C-X in the 2009 defence budget, choosing instead to 
divert funds to the immediate upgrades of the F-15s.  
 
MSDF power projection capabilities have been boosted by the procurement of three 
Ōsumi-class transport ships, with flat decks for the landing of transport helicopters 
and an integral rear dock for the operation of hovercraft capable of landing tanks. The 
MSDF justifies these ships as necessary for GSDF UNPKO and other ‘international 
operations in support of peace’, and two of the class have already been deployed to 
East Timor, Iraq, and to Sumatra during the 2003-2004 Asian tsunami humanitarian 
operations.  
 
Most significantly, the MSDF is constructing two new DDH (Destroyer-Helicopter) 
Hyūga class vessels, each displacing 13,500 tons deadweight (and approximately 
20,000 tons when fully loaded with fuels and weapons) and with a standard 
complement of three SH-60J and one MCH-101 helicopters. The first of the class, the 
Hyuga, was commissioned in March 2009. Despite the JMOD’s designation of these 
vessels as destroyers, the fact that they are the largest ships launched by the MSDF in 
the post-war period at 13,500 tonnes (equivalent in displacement to Spanish, Italian 
and UK helicopter carriers and light carriers), combined with their end-to-end flat 
tops and below deck hangars, and their capacity to carry up to eleven helicopters 
including MH-53Es, indicates that Japan is now reviving its expertise in aircraft 
carrier technologies.  
 
The MSDF is further seeking indigenous development of a P-X replacement for its P-
3C patrol and surveillance aircraft (although Japan has faced pressure for purchasing 
the US Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft), with an expanded 8,000 kilometre range 
suited to patrolling as far as the further reaches of the South China Sea. 
 
Japan’s other major procurement project is BMD, which occupies the largest budget 
item for the 2004-2009, and the objective is to roll out the full panoply of BMD 
systems by 2011. The MSDF has procured an off-the shelf BMD system with a 
Standard Missile-3 Block IA (SM-3 BLK IA) from the US, and seeks to fit BMD 
capabilities to a total of six Aegis-equipped Kongō and Atago class destroyers. The 
MSDF conducted its first successful interceptor test launch off the coast of Hawaii in 
December 2008. Its second in November 2008 proved less successful—the SM-3 
interceptor failing to track the target ballistic missile—but still the BMD Aegis system 
was deemed to have passed most of the test objectives.14 Japan and the US in the 
meantime continue to work on upgrades to the interceptor missile to create the SM-3 
                                                 
14 ‘MSDF’s SM-3 Test Fails to Shoot Down Missile’, The Japan Times Online, 21 November 2008, 
http://searchjapantimes.co.jp/print/nn20081121a3.html; ‘Despite Failure, Missile Defense System 
OK’d’, The Japan Times Online, 17 December 2008, 
http://searchjapantimes.co.jp/print/nn20081217a3.html. 
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Block IIA (SM-3 BLK IIA).  
 
The ASDF between 2006 and 2008 completed the deployment of four Patriot 
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) terminal phase interceptor batteries, consisting of 
sixteen fire units (FU), at bases around Tokyo. The essential responsibility of these 
batteries is to defend the capital, and the ASDF conducted drills for deployments in 
Yoyogi Park and Shinjuku Gyōen National Garden in central Tokyo in September 
2007 and January 2008. The ASDF successfully tested the PAC-3 system in New 
Mexico in September 2008. It also deployed the PAC-3 system to Iwate and Akita 
prefectures in March 2009 in readiness for a possible intercept of a North Korean 
missile test scheduled for the following month. The ASDF has completed the upgrade 
of its Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) command and control system 
to create the Japan Air Defence Ground Environment (JADGE) as the principal 
coordinator of Japanese air defence in the event of a missile attack. The JSDF is 
further upgrading the FPS-3UG (Enhanced Capability) ground-based radar and 
developing a new FPS-XX ground-based radar for BMD purposes.  
 
The JSDF is further attempting to embark on its own US-style ‘force transformation’. 
The Japan has moved towards the indigenous development of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) for coastal battlefield surveillance, including this item for the first 
time in the defence budget in 2009. The JSDF has now begun to embark on joint tri-
service operations, experimenting with force integration for the first time during the 
Asian tsunami humanitarian relief operations, with GSDF helicopters and trucks 
operating from the MSDF’s Ōsumi amphibious ships. 
 
Japan’s military space programme 
Japanese policy-makers have now moved decisively to break the 1969 principle on 
the peaceful use of space. These moves first gained momentum in the wake of North 
Korea’s Taepodong-1 test in 1998, with the introduction of ‘multi-purpose satellites 
(tamoku-teki eisei) or ‘intelligence-gathering satellites’ (jōhō shūshū eisei) (ISG).15 
Japan uses these terminologies to obfuscate the military nature of these satellites. 
Japan between 2003 and 2007 completed the launch of four indigenously produced 
ISGs, two optical and two with synthetic aperture radar (SAR). These satellites have 
already proved of some use in monitoring North Korea’s missile bases, although at 
resolutions of 1 metre for the optical satellites and 1-3 metres for the SAR they lack 
the capabilities of those of the US. Japan thus still remains dependent on crucial infra-
red satellite surveillance from the United States for the detection of actual missile 
launches and the early-warning necessary to operate any BMD system.  
 
Japan’s government in deploying these satellites has incrementally shifted from its 
original 1969 interpretation of peaceful (heiwa no mokuteki) as ‘non-military’ 
(higunji) to now emphasising instead the ‘defensive’ military use of space. In June 
2007, the LDP introduced into the National Diet a new Basic Law for Space 
Activities, Article 2 of which states that Japan will conduct activities in space in 
accordance with the principles of the Constitution, thereby now permitting the use of 
space for ‘defensive’ purposes.16  
                                                 
15 Sunohara Tsuyoshi, Tanjō Kokusan Supai Eisei: Dokuji Jōhō to Nichibei Dōmei (Tokyo: Nihon 
Keizai Shimbunsha, 2005). 




The Basic Law mandated the August 2008 establishment of a Strategic Headquarters 
for the Development of Outer Space (SHDOS) within the Cabinet under the direction 
of the Prime Minister. In turn, the JMOD established its own Committee on the 
Promotion of Outer Space in September 2008 to advise on space-related activities in 
the upcoming revisions of the NDPG and MTDP. The SHDOS produced a draft report 
in November 2008, notable for arguing that Japan might need to introduce infrared 
early-warning satellites for detecting ballistic missiles in their launch phase.17 The 
JMOD Committee on the Promotion of Outer Space produced its first report on 15 
January 2009. It similarly argued that Japan should promote the use of 
communications, global positioning and weather satellites, investigate means to 
protect its satellites from ASAT, and to improve IGS capabilities and investigating the 
acquisition of infrared early warning satellites to improve the effectiveness of BMD.18
 
Japan’s participation in the miltiarisation of space is clearly driven by its assessment 
of the regional security environment. Japanese policy-makers perceive a requirement 
to try to catch-up with China’s burgeoning military space capabilities, and even 
maintain parity with South Korea’s and India’s military interests in space. Japan 
further requires enhanced capabilities to keep in step with and improve 
interoperability with its US ally, but also to try to lessen dependence on the US for 
key early-warning satellites for BMD. Japan’s ability to develop a full-range of 
satellite capabilities will be constrained by its tight defence budget, but it seems the 
revised 2009 NDPG for 2009 and 2010-2014 MTDP will emphasise the continuing 
build-up in this area.  
 
Japan Coast Guard 
The JCG, Japan’s paramilitary force, has been quietly augmenting its own capabilities 
and external power projection capabilities. The JCG’s Shikishima-class Patrol Large 
Helicopter (PLH) displaces approximately 6,500 tons and is larger than the MSDF’s 
Kongō-class Aegis destroyers; it also carries two helicopters, and is armed with two 
twin 35-milimetre cannons and an M61 20-milimetre gatling gun. The JCG has a 
further fifty-five vessels over 1,000 tons, many of which are similar in displacement 
to the MSDF’s Hatsuyuki-class destroyers. The JCG is reported to have a tonnage 
close to 60 per cent of that of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).19 The 
JCG also disposes its own quasi-special forces in the shape a Special Security Team 
(SST) for boarding of ships; and has long-range early-warning and patrol craft. The 
JCG has projected power through participation in US-led Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) multinational exercises; and through increasing joint bilateral anti-
piracy exercises with states in Southeast Asia, and with ulterior motive of indicating 
Japan’s willingness to China to exert its presence in the South China Sea.20  
 
                                                 
17  ‘Govt May Propose Missile Defense Satellite’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 Novemeber 2008, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20081105TDY020307.htm. 
18 Bōeishōō Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Iinkai, Uchu Kaihatsu Riyo ni Kansuru Kihon Hoshin ni Tsuite, 15 
January 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/uchuukaihatsu/pdf/kihonhoushin.pdf, pp. 4, 6. 
19 Richard J. Samuels, ‘“New Fighting Power!” Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian 
Security’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 3, Winter 2007–2008, p. 99. 
20  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental 
Dimensions (Boulder: CO, Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 222-226. 
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Conclusion: JSDF proactive procurement and proactivity in overall 
security policy 
Japan’s strategic environment has dictated that it continues to pursue the long-term 
modernisation of its military forces. Japan has had to make tough decisions about new 
procurements in the context of a constrained defence budget, in some cases delaying 
or rolling over procurements. Nevertheless, Japan has succeeded in significantly 
pushing forward its defensive and potentially even offensive power projection 
capabilities since the 2004 NDPG. Japan is remodelling a more mobile GSDF, an 
ASDF with greater regional and global reach, and an MSDF with amphibious and 
carrier technologies. Japan is moving steadily forward with the deployment of BMD 
and new space technologies, and the JCG is expanding its capabilities and the range 
of its missions. Japan is in many cases engaged in something of a quiet arms race with 
China: matching Chinese growing air power with its own enhanced air defensive 
power; countering Chinese growing blue-water naval ambitions with its own more 
capable anti-submarine and carrier assets; and attempting to nullify Chinese ballistic 
and cruise missiles. Japan’s procurement programmes are simultaneously designed to 
provide the types of capabilities that slot well into the necessary inventories for 
participation in US-led coalitions.  
 
The Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Defence, currently charged with helping to 
devise the new NDPG and MTDP for 2009 onwards, is composed of members who 
have argued consistently in the past for a more assertive Japanese stance on national 
defence and for greater US-Japan alliance cooperation.21 The Advisory Group is thus 
likely to counsel a redoubling of efforts in these areas, to press ahead with the F-X, C-
X and BMD programmes, and to continue efforts to quietly counter China’s rise.   
 
Japan’s ongoing process of military modernisation and power projection has thus not 
been halted by budget constraints nor by political machinations in recent years, and 
demonstrates that Japan’s proactivism in security has certainly not ground to a halt 
post-Koizumi. Japan has not retreated into its security shell, but is actually engaged in 
a long term programme to acquire the types of capabilities that will allow it an 
expanded role in international security. In this sense, Japan’s security policy, view in 
conjunction with other key developments such as civilian control, defence production, 
the US-Japan alliance, and shifts in anti-militaristic norms, has not hit the buffers in 
recent years, and, even if less spectacular after Koizumi, continues on its gradual 
trajectory of ‘normalisation’ under his successors.22  
                                                 
21 ‘Bōei Taikō Kaitei Honkaku Giron e: Chūchō Kokusai Kōken ni Jūten’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 9 
January 2009, p. 2; Kaneko Masafumi, ‘Bōei Taikō o Dō Minaosu ka’, PHP Policy Review, vol. 2, no. 
11, 10 December 2008, p. 7. 
22 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: Routledge, 2009).  
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